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Summary
The Russian Federation played a crucial role in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
Indeed, after the US decision not to comply with the treaty, its ratification turned out to
be indispensable for the Protocol to become legally binding. In early 2002, the Russian
government decided to initiate the ratification process. However, notwithstanding this
initial commitment, the country long hesitated to fulfil its promises, and for the last two
years it  sent numerous contradictory signals with respect to its position on climate
policy. As a consequence, the factors that shape Russia’s behaviour in the context of
climate negotiations received increasing attention. The main focus has been on the
economic and international aspects motivating the Russian strategy. This paper attempts
to complete this analysis by concentrating on a further feature that significantly
contributed to Russia’s final decision, namely domestic forces. These factors have often
been overlooked in the discussion of the Russian strategy. In order  to fill this gap, this
paper reconstructs the Russian ratification process, trying to identify the main domestic
players and their role. Our findings provide various indications on the reasons of the
recent developments in Russia, confirming the key role of the Russian President.
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RUSSIA: THE LONG ROAD TO RATIFICATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The Russian Federation has played a crucial role in the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. A precondition
for making the agreement legally binding is that at least 55 Parties to the Convention, representing at least
55% of the 1990 carbon dioxide emissions in industrialised countries, must have ratified the Protocol. After
the US decided to withdraw from the treaty, with its 17% share of emissions Russia has held the key to
Kyoto for a long while.
Although the decision by the government to start the process of ratification for the Kyoto climate treaty
goes back to April 11
th, 2002, Russia has long hesitated to fulfil it. Indeed, the last two year-period has been
characterised by a number of contradictory signals. However, a series of international agreements has been
signed, whose adoption was predicted to have a positive repercussion on the signing of Kyoto. Finally, the
recent approval of the treaty by the lower House of Parliament and a bill signed by President Putin have
been internationally welcomed as the last move preceding the Protocol’s entry into force.
Several studies have been conducted to assess the factors that shape Russian behaviour in climate
negotiations. The economic implications of the Protocol’s ratification for the country have been analysed in
order to define the incentives to participate in the treaty. Other approaches have focused on concessions in
international policy areas, like the support for WTO membership, as the main goals in Russian
brinkmanship strategy.
One hypothesis is based on a costs and benefits analysis and the other refers to the consequences of the
bargaining strategy of Russia. Together, they represent the economic and the international sides of the
ratification process. Both of the approaches provide key elements to understanding Russian reluctance to
adopt the Kyoto framework. To enrich the picture, however, a further factor must be added, namely
domestic forces which have contributed importantly to the fate of the Protocol.
This paper focuses on these internal factors. After a detailed reconstruction of the Russian ratification
process, this work separately considers the main domestic actors and their role in it. The country’s political
system is analysed through its ambiguities, inherited by the collapse of the former regime, and its recent
controversial reform, undertaken by President Putin. It is argued that the apparent antagonism within and
between governmental departments, together with the redundant number of institutions in charge of
environmental protection, have impacted the Kyoto Protocol adoption process.
The large and unstable energy sector is taken into consideration for its interactions with political power.
The paper will also discuss the federal government response to what it considers to be a threat represented
by the treaty’s potential benefits to the industry. A further section centres on the Russian environmental
non-governmental organizations. While lacking strong national support and public involvement, NGOs
operating on environment protection are numerous and represent one of the voices most clearly in favour of3
the ratification. Finally, the paper examines the media sector, concentrating on its role in the negotiation
process.
2. APRIL 2002 – NOVEMBER 2004: THE RUSSIAN RATIFICATION PROCESS
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted by 84 countries at the Third Conference of Parties to the Climate
Convention in December 1997. It sets the target of reducing by 2008-2012 global emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases by about 5% compared to 1990 levels. Opened for signature in 1998,
the treaty must be ratified by at least 55 countries to become legally effective, representing at least 55% of
the 1990 GHG emissions in industrialized countries. While the first condition was fulfilled in May 2002 by
the ratification of the treaty by Iceland, the declaration by US President George W. Bush that the United
States of America would step away from the Protocol represented a hurdle for the second threshold to be
crossed. The 36.4% American share of Annex I emissions means that a large coalition of countries is now
needed to secure the Protocol. Altogether the shares of the European Union (24.2%) and Japan (8.5%), plus
nations from Central and Eastern Europe, Canada and Norway, represent 44.07% of 1990s CO2 emissions.
With its 17.4%, then, the Russian Federation holds the deciding vote on whether the Protocol will ever
become legally effective.
Although the decision by the government to start the process of ratification of the Kyoto climate treaty goes
back to April 11
th 2002, Russia has long hesitated to fulfil it. The last two year-period, however, has
witnessed at the same time conflicting assessments by government’s members, encouraging declarations
forecasting a ratification in the very near future, domestic groups of influence taking action, and fruitful
international meetings. Indeed, at the end of this process, Russia has decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in
October 2004. The following section will briefly outline the facts and the main actors involved in the
process.
The necessary formal procedure of ratifying the Kyoto Protocol was launched by a decision of the Russian
government, which postponed consideration of the issue four times since March 14
th 2002.  According to
the formal procedure, the Minister of Economic Development and Trade must report on the impacts of the
implementation  to the Deputy Prime Minister, who has to raise the question in a meeting of the
government. Then the government has to pass the ratification bill and the supplementary papers to the
Russian Parliament’s Lower House, the Duma, whose Bureau must nominate Committees to consider
details and report to the plenary. The plenary has one to three official hearings on adopting the law for
ratification by 50% of the votes. Finally, the Council of the Russian Federation (Parliament’s Upper House)
considers and adopts the law with the President’s signature.
In January 2003, the Minister of Economic Development and Trade, German Gref, sent his paper to the
Deputy Prime Minister Victor Khristenko for the first time, including very skeptical views on Kyoto, but he4
was asked to improve the submission.  Before this bureaucratic act, however, the Russian government had
twice expressed its commitment in a brief ratification process. In the concluding statement of the ninth EU-
Russia  Summit on the May 29
th 2002, it was emphasized that the  “environmental aspects of the Russia-EU
relations are taking concrete shape […] We will make every necessary effort to ensure that the Kyoto
Protocol becomes a real tool for solving the problems of global warming as soon as possible”
1. Moreover,
during the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in September 2002, Russia
officially reiterated its commitment to ratification. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov announced that
Moscow hoped to adopt the Kyoto Protocol “in the very near future”
2.
On the same day, the Russian newspaper Pravda reported a statement of the then-Deputy minister of
Economic Development and Trade of Russia, Mohammed Tsikanov, affirming that “’Russia is losing
economic reasons to ratify the Kyoto Protocol” because of the impact of the US position at the WSSD talks
on Russia’s “ability to negotiate the quota of emissions”
3. While having at that time represented a political
act without precedent, double and contradicting announcements were bound to become a constant in the
Russian vicissitudes toward Kyoto.
This type of bargaining has continued around the Protocol, notably in conjunction with a number of
bilateral discussions between Russia and Canadian, Japanese, and European delegations. Among others, an
extremely representative sample of this tendency was shown during the World Climate Change Conference
which took place in Moscow from the 
 September 29
th to October 3
rd of 2003. Announced on the occasion of
the EU-Russia summit of May 2002, the Conference was taken as a signal of Russia’s interest regarding
environment and as a good omen for the Kyoto Protocol.
The international meeting was preceded by two encouraging declarations. In June of 2003 the working
group of the Presidium of State Council of the Russian Federation (Gossovet), an advisory body,
representing the governors of Russia’s 89 federal administrative units and chaired by President Vladimir
Putin, recommended ratification of the Protocol. In September, the Russian Interagency Committee on
Climate Change (a body which advises the President in his final decisions about climate change policies
4)
approved a draft concept of the legal basis for implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the national legislation,
that was prepared by the Ministry for Economics.
Given the seemingly favourable context, many observers expected that the Putin government would issue
papers for the Duma to start preparing a law on ratification. However, addressing the Moscow Conference
on Climate Change, the Russian president visibly avoided offering any commitments on the Kyoto
Protocol. He said that “Russia stands for the quickest possible ratification” of Kyoto, but then affirmed that




there were still “difficult and unclear problems”
5. He joked that global warming might be good for frigid
Russia
6.
The government’s declaration contradicted Putin’s chief economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, who
predicted a few days earlier that Russia would not ratify the Protocol. In a presentation headed “The Kyoto
Protocol is discriminatory against Russia”, Illarionov swept aside arguments that Russia would benefit
economically from ratification through its ability to sell emission credits to other countries. He warned that
strong projected economic growth and the likelihood of stronger emission curbs later turn Russia into a
buyer rather than a seller of credits. He also presented ten questions, which were answered by members of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) attending the conference. In a second speech
Illarionov claimed that he was totally unconvinced by responses
7.
The Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (the highest institution established by the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change) held in Milan in December of 2003 provided the stage for a
surprisingly similar episode. On Tuesday December 4
rt the international media reported Andrei Illarionov
saying that Russia would withdrawal from the Protocol because it would slow economic growth
8. In a
hurriedly organized news conference that was called to offset the impression left by Putin’s adviser’s
comments, a few hours later Minister for Economic Development and Trade Tsikanov said that “there are
no decisions about ratification of the Kyoto Protocol except that we are moving toward ratification”
9. A
diplomatic incident nearly occurred on Thursday 6
th when Illarionov said that he was speaking for President
Vladimir Putin when he rejected the Kyoto pact, adding that the Deputy Economy Minister who
contradicted him was mistaken: “the statement was made physically by me, but the words I was using were
those of the Russian President”
10.
The Russians’ ambiguous stance on ratification had not changed even in the months that preceded the
meeting in Milan. While repeating his good will in several international occasions (as in the October 19
th
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Bangkok,), Putin did not miss any opportunities to sit at the
negotiating table, whatever it might be. He received a visit from former US President Bush and former US
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to speak about the treaty, followed by a Russia-US Summit in S.
Petersburg less than one month later. A European Parliament delegation met their counterpart from the
Duma in Moscow and there were innumerable other visits from EU member states and the Commission on
the subject as well.
                                                                                                                                                                                             








Parliamentary elections in December 2003 and Presidential elections in March 2004 were also referred as
events able to interfere with the debate. Environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and the WWF,
participating in the Climate Change Conference in Milan, affirmed that the statement of the Russian
economic advisor against the Kyoto Protocol was “nothing more than pre-election bluster”
11. President
Putin said to journalists that he was determined to ratify but problems would rather lay with Duma
12.
Many observers saw the victory of the presidential party as an encouraging signal: the opposing wing being
cut off, they argued, should have accelerated ratification after the presidential elections. Last December’s
parliamentary election gave near total control of the Duma and its committees to the pro-Kremlin United
Russia party. This, together with Putin’s landslide victory in the Presidential elections on March 14
th, meant
that ratification of Kyoto was in Putin’s hands.
Despite this seemingly clear cut political context, however, Russia’s government and Parliament looked to
be headed for a collision on April 15
th, with key Duma committees rejecting the Protocol and one major
ministry speaking out in favour of the environmental treaty. Some economic ministers had already backed
the pact, and the addition of the influential Minister of Industry and Energy to their number appeared to be
a move torwards forming a single government position. Viktor Borisovich Khristenko prepared a report for
Putin (who last October ordered state bodies to report on Kyoto before the Kremlin ruled on the issue by
May 20) arguing that the protocol poses not threat to Russian economy. The Ministry said that even if
Russia’s economic growth remains at the level of 8% a year, the average level of greenhouse gas emissions
in 2008-2012 will still be 15% less than the level determined for Russia in the Kyoto Protocol.
During the State Duma Parliament hearing “On Problems related with the ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol”, which took place the same day, a group of committees concluded that “ratification is inexpedient
given the US pullout and the non-participation of many countries with high levels of man-made impact on
climatic processes”. The hearing was conducted on the initiative of the Committee on Ecology in
cooperation with the Committee on Economic Policy, Business and Tourism and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs. According to Reuters, several deputies were clearly uncomfortable about making a decision
without guidance from higher authorities and an official presidential position or an official government
position
13. Greenpeace defined the hearing “a great defeat” of the Kyoto opponents
14.
The followings days were crowded with anonymous statements to the media by governmental sources. On
April 19
th the news agency Itar-Tass reported that Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov met
                                                          
11 Press Office by Greenpeace International, quoted in http://www.bioscinews.com/files/news-
details.asp?NewsID=5498
12 Interview with the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin, for The New York Times, reported in
http://pws.prserv.net/misrusce/pr21-03.htm
13 Reported by Reuters in http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L15404923.htm
14 http://www.greenpeace.org/russia_en/news/details?item_id=4583007
his counterpart John Prescott in London to discuss the Protocol
15. On the 21
st, an anonymous Kremlin
member told the daily Kommersant that the announcement of the ratification may be made during a two-
day visit to Russia by Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, which had started the day before. “If
Russia’s policy shift on Kyoto is not made public during the visit it is likely to emerge at the EU-Russia
summit in May”
16.
Forecasts of this kind represent a standard feature of the Kyoto debate. As shown above, during the last
two-year period, every international appointment has been predicted to be the defining crossroads of the
process. The same fate happened to the visit of the European Commission President Romano Prodi in
Moscow on April 22
nd. Although both the Russian and the European President never made the link explicit,
according to many observers the EU tried to coax Russia into ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse
gases by offering to smooth Moscow’s accession to the World Trade Organisation. Parts of those talks have
also been issues related with the European enlargement: such as Kaliningrad, a key cargo transit zone
wedged between new EU members Poland and Lithuania, and the PCA (Partnership and Cooperation
Accord) between Moscow and European Union. An agreement to extend their economic and political
relationship to the Union’s 10 new members (PCA) and to allow Russia free transit of goods to Kaliningrad
was signed few days later.
One more time, given the positive outcome of the meeting, great expectations were thrown on the
forthcoming EU-Russia Summit in Moscow. For a long time there had been speculation that the EU might
back Russian WTO membership in return for Moscow’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. During the EU-
Russia summit on 21
st May 2004, EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and the Russian Economy
Development and Trade Minister German Gref signed the agreement concluding the bilateral market access
negotiations for the accession of the Russian Federation to the WTO. The deal covers the commitments that
the Russian Federation will undertake in good and services once it accedes to the WTO
17.
Although there was no formal mention of the Kyoto Protocol in the agreement, and although, according to
its President, Russia did not make any linkage between the WTO and the Kyoto Protocol issues in talks,
American AP news agency reported Putin to speak positively of Kyoto afterwards. “The EU has met us
halfway in talks over the WTO and that cannot but affect positively our position on the Kyoto Protocol,”
Putin told a news conference. “We will speed up the movement on Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto
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18. The premise of accelerating the process, however, was the clearest statement on the subject:
again President referred to the Duma’s crucial role in the process.
Analysts commented that presidential economic advisor Illarionov’s public resistance
19 (in April he told
reporters in St. Petersburg that the Kyoto Protocol can be called an international Auschwitz) might have
been aimed at improving Russia’s bargaining position in its bid to join the World Trade Organization. In
the following days, several EU ministers admitted they have given in to Russia’s position that the Kyoto
Protocol is connected to other EU-Russia issues, although they denied any direct links
20.
Positive expectations regarding an imminent ratification were strengthened by the draft of the Russian
government report to be submitted to the Prime Minister on May 20
th. It said that Russia’s emissions would
not exceed its Kyoto target in the first commitment period, that the Protocol would not be damaging to
Russian economy, and might be potentially beneficial to the Russian energy sector. However, the day
before, the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) issued a statement denouncing Kyoto Protocol as lacking
scientific foundation and dangerous to National interests. Although the RAN had already expressed this
opinion in 2003 and although the view of the mastermind behind the statement, academician Yuri Israel,
has been known for a long time, it is difficult to ignore the RAN’s resolution since Putin has asked both the
Academy and the Government to formulate their views.
One more controversial exchange, then, that follows one more prediction about ratification. The tenth
Conference of the Parties (COP-10) to the UNFCCC will take place in Buenos Aires in December. A voice
as influential as that of the head of the UN Environmental Program Klaus Töpfer stated twice in a week last
June that Russia will formally announce its ratification during the summit. In the light of the latest treaty on
WTO accession, many observers agree that ratification is closer than ever.
Nevertheless, Russian presidential economic advisor Andrei Illarionov continued its anti-Kyoto campaign
in the beginning of July at a Moscow press conference, calling the Kyoto Protocol according to Interfax an
"undeclared war against Russia"
21. However, perhaps more importantly, he did no longer rule out the
possibility that Russia will ratify: "If this decision is approved, it won't be on the basis of a substantial
analysis, and not for substantial reasons, but for other reasons. We can't completely rule this out.”
Indeed, after President Putin's promise to speed up the ratification process, the positive signs towards Kyoto
multiplied. Indeed, the support for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol seemed to be growing in Russia,
and the signs were more positive than ever. In particular, Benedikt von Butler, the trading director for
                                                          
18 Reported by New York Times in
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/22/business/worldbusiness/22trad.html?th=&pageweb.htm
19 Illarionov made a presentation at National Press Club, Washington DC, January 2004; see
http://www.iccfglobal.org/Slides/Illarionov%20Slides.PPT
20 Articles in http://www.pointcarbon.com/article.php?articleID=3757
21  http://www.pointcarbon.com/article.php?articleID=4075&categoryID=1479




Still, the Kyoto opponents strengthened their efforts to stop the progress of these developments. This has
been confirmed at the end of June by Russia’s e-daily Ros Business Consulting (RBC) that stressed, based
on statements of the local research group "Russia and Kyoto Protocol", that Russia can benefit from Kyoto
only if it is guaranteed sales of 100-130 million tonnes of CO2e at a price of no less than 40 dollars per
tonne.
23
The subsequent period was characterized by intense internal debates on the weaknesses and strengths of the
Kyoto Protocol, accumulating in negative signals observed by Reuters in the first week of September.
According to a draft report, signed by the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and Energy Minister
Viktor Khristenko, scepticism towards Kyoto has been revealed, claiming that it “is ineffective for
resolving the main duty of the convention - stabilizing greenhouse has concentration”. However, the
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stressed immediately that Russia still intended to approve the
Kyoto Protocol, despite the official papers suggesting the Government was turning against it. Russian
officials thus continued to be apparently split on the issue of Kyoto.
On September 22, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) reported that the Russian President Putin has instructed
key ministers to sign the Kyoto ratification documents. Although this has not immediately been confirmed
by Russian government sources, in the days after this announcement the real movement in the Russian
ratification process has been underpinned. Indeed, the issuing of ratification documents by the Kremlin has
been confirmed as both the Russian Natural Resources Ministry Yury Trutnev and the Russian
Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref signed President Putin’s package of
ratification documents for the Kyoto Protocol.
As expected, Russia’s anti-Kyoto lobby did not lose time to react to President Putin’s obvious step
towards ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Putin’s economic adviser Andrei Illarionov was quoted by RIA
Novosti  to compare the Protocol to “fascism”
24, while the head of the lobby group Russia and the Kyoto
Protocol Anna Kashirova told journalists the decision to ratify had still not been made.
However, on September 28
th, Russia’s strongest Kyoto opponent, Andrei Illarionov, stated for the first time
that he believes in Russia’s close ratification. In particular, the Moscow Times quoted him saying that
Russia will ratify due to a purely political calculation  in a “gesture toward the European Union”.
Illarionov’s statement has been interpreted as evidence for a near decision by Russian authorities.
                                                          
22 Reported by Wall Street Journal on June 2
nd, 2004, in http://www.afr.com/articles/2004/06/01/1086058850473.html
23 According to an analyst of this group only guaranteed annual carbon sales of 5 billion USD over 10-12 years can
justify Russia's accession to the Kyoto Protocol.
24  http://www.mosnews.com/money/2004/09/27/illarionovkyoto.shtml10
Indeed, the day after, numerous reports, all based on the Russian news agency Itar-Tass, strengthened the
expectation that Russia was convinced that the correct political moment to ratify Kyoto has arrived. On
September 30
th 2004, the Russian government has approved the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and sent
it to parliament for ratification.
25 The decision by the parliament, whose approval is necessary for the
treaty’s ratification, was expected to take place within the next weeks and was in general considered as a
mere formality. In fact, after Russia’s move has world-wide been welcomed as an important step in opening
the way for the Kyoto Protocol’s entry-into force, on October 12
th President Putin unambiguously backed
the Kyoto Protocol in his first public comments since his government sent it to the State Duma for
ratification.
26 Following these developments, a key committee of the Russian State Duma recommended on
October 14




nd, 2004, the State Duma of the Russian Federation endorsed ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol by a vote of 334 to 74. As a next step in the ratification process, Russia's upper house of
parliament, the Federation Council, ratified the Kyoto Protocol on October 27
th by a vote of 139 to 1, and
sent it to President Putin for final approval
28. On November 4
th, President Putin signed a bill confirming
Russia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, removing thus the last barrier for its entry into force as the
ratification papers can now be sent to the United Nations
29. The Kyoto Protocol came into force on
February 16
th, 2005, 90 days after Russia’s formal instrument of ratification has been deposited with the
Secretary-General of the UN. The Protocol’s entry into force made the emissions targets taken on for the
2008-2012 period by more than 30 developed countries, including the EU, Russia, Japan, Canada, New
Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, legally binding.
3. ANALYSIS: INTERNAL FORCES
Since the statement of the then Prime Minister Kasyanov at the World Summit on Sustainable Development
on  September 3
rd 2002, signals regarding Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol have been increasingly
conflicting and nebulous. Some of the reasons undoubtedly lie in economics. In several occasions Putin has
made it clear that Russia will make its decision based on Moscow’s economic and foreign policy goals, and
how they correspond to the “emission trading regime” allowed for in the Protocol. By creating a new
market niche for emission trading, Russia will be able to gain from the surplus of emission rights that it is
supposed to have under Kyoto’s first reduction commitment period (2008-2012), due to post-Soviet
industrial collapse. Besides selling its own reduction credits, as a signatory country, Russia will also be able
                                                          
25 See BBC News, Russia backs Kyoto climate treaty, September 30th, 2004. Downloaded at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3702640.stm on September 30
th, 2004.
26 Reported by Reuters, see  http://www.mosnews.com/news/2004/10/12/putinkyoto.shtml
27 http://www.mosnews.com/money/2004/10/14/kyotodate.shtml
28  http://top.rbc.ru/english/index.shtml?/news/english/2004/10/27/27143328_bod.shtml11
to acquire “emission reduction units” by financing projects reducing greenhouse gas emissions in other
developed countries through a mechanism known as “joint implementation”. On the contrary, opponents
state that Russia will soon exceed its emissions limits, and will then have to introduce costly measures for
emission reductions, stymieing its own GPD growth.
A further key factor in understanding the tortuousness of the process toward ratification are domestic
pressures operating at various levels. Interactions among different Russian institutions, big business, non-
governmental players, public opinion (although this may be disputable) need to be taken into consideration
in order to gain a holistic picture. After having briefly examined the chronology of events, this paper moves
to focus the way internal forces have impacted the course of the Russian adoption of the Protocol and
continue to do so today.
3.1. Russian governmental authorities
3.1.1. Legislative branch
The Russian legislative branch is shaped by a bicameral Federal Assembly (or Federalnoye Sobraniye),
which consists of the Federation Council (or Sovet Federatsii
30) and the State Duma (or Gosudarstvennaya
Duma
31). During last  December’s lower chamber election, the relative majority of vote went to United
Russia party (37,1%), granting this pro-Putin party 222 seats in the Parliament. This, together with the 71,2
percent of vote that Vladimir Putin obtained in the last presidential election (March 14
th 2004), means that
the ratification bill is virtually guaranteed a smooth passage through the Parliament. In fact, the recent
approval of the treaty by the Duma meant that the final ratification by Putin would have simply been a
matter of time.
While hearings on the ratification such as that of April 2004 may have enhanced the understanding of the
issues involved within the Duma, their main role could have been to air different views on ratification to the
outside world and establish the terms of the agreement. Bobo Lo, an eminent American scholar of Russian
history, argues that such a tactic was used after September 11
th , when Putin succeeded in positioning
Russia as an ally for United States, while allowing the Duma to spell out what Russia expected in return
32.
                                                                                                                                                                                             
29 Reported by Associate Press, see
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/R/RUSSIA_KYOTO_PROTOCOL?SITE=WAOLY&SECTION=HOME&TEM
PLATE=DEFAULT
30 178 seats; as of July 2000, members appointed by the top executive and legislative officials in each of the 89 federal
administrative units - oblasts, krays, republics, autonomous okrugs and oblasts, and the federal cities of Moscow and
Saint Petersburg; members serve four-year terms. This, like all the administrative information that follow, are
available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html
31 450 seats; 225 seats elected by proportional representation from party lists winning at least 5% of the vote, and 225
seats from single-member constituencies; members are elected by direct, popular vote to serve four-year terms
32 BO L., Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy, Chatham House Papers, Oxford, Blackwell,
200312
3.1.2. Executive branch
As shown above, controversial statements over ratification have been fed by apparent antagonism within
and between governmental departments. Although a public show of debate between different officials is
normal, the different positions reflected by the press have been interpreted as a reflection of the embedded
interest of departments and individuals
33.  Maybe the brightest example of this conflict emerged in early
2003: the Minister of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) sent the Prime Minister Khristenko
papers and proposals regarding ratification twice between January and March, including very skeptical
views on Kyoto, but in both cases Khristenko asked to improve the submission. It has been argued that
MEDT represented the most serious opposition to ratification, being the Ministry officially nominated to
lead the ratification process. “MEDT was an early supporter of ratification but turned against it in early
2002 as it became clear that major emissions reductions projects would go to the Ministry of Energy […]
After pressure from the President’s Office last year, MEDT toed the official line and Muhamed Tsikanov
has been the forefront of highlighting that the decision on ratification is still to be made”
34.
Relationships between departments on climatic matters are supposed to be regulated by the Interagency
Commission of the Russian Federation on Climate Change Problems. The Russian government in 1994
established the commission to coordinate all activities related to the development of climate change
policies. Its decisions are not legally binding, and it cannot mandate ministries to implement any climate
change policies
35. The Commission is an advisory body, while the final decisions about climate change
policies rest in President Putin’s hands. In 1999 the government issued a decree revising the composition of
the Commission. It now has 32 members from various ministries, research institutes, as well as two
representatives from Russia’s biggest natural monopolies (Gazprom and the Unified Electric Power
Systems of Russia – RAO EES) which dominate the Russian energy sector. The federal agencies that play
the largest role in the commission and in implementing climate change policies are Hydromet, which leads
the Commission, and the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Energy. Each agency sends
representatives to international climate change negotiations, with the delegation headed by Hydromet.
Until it was disbanded by a presidential decree, the Russian State Committee for Environmental Protection,
Goscomecologia, participated in the Commission. Some of Goscomecologia’s functions were transferred to
the Ministry of Natural Resources, which does not take an active role in climate change. This institutional
change weakened the Commission and coordination of climate change policies in Russia because
Goscomecologia was actively involved in conducting inventories and had knowledgeable experts on
international climate change negotiations. Goscomecologia had branches in all regions and was responsible
for collecting information about air pollution from industrial facilities.
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The interagency status of the commission limits its role to designing climate change mitigation programs
and coordinating work among the participating agencies. For example, several ministries simultaneously
work on programs such as joint implementation and monitoring. The commission made suggestions about
dividing work on the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, but a formal decision about this has not been made
so far. Jurisdictional issues occasionally arise on who should be responsible for implementing flexible
mechanisms. Representatives from the Ministry for Energy and the Ministry for Economics consider their
agencies to be responsible for issuing permits in a domestic or international system
36.
The Commission has not formally met for several years, even though all international climate change
documents require its approval. In reality, the Commission functions as a part of Hydromet, which is
ineffective because Hydromet has no responsibility for the economy or for the energy sector
37. Leading
Hydromet figures are known to oppose Kyoto and even to have concluded that climate change would be
beneficial to Russia.
In spite of the fact that the effects on the Kyoto Protocol are not yet apparent, the reform of the
government’s departmental structures carried through by the President Putin on  March 9
th 2004 might have
opened new possibilities. All former ministerial structures have been divided into three groups. In the first
group are federal ministries that have passed to the direct jurisdiction of the president as head of the
executive branch of government: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry for Emergency Situations. Another nine federal
ministries are under the prime minister’s jurisdiction: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health and
Social Development, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Culture and
Information, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Education and
Science, the Ministry of Industry and Energy, and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
However, all their activities are the reserve of the federal ministries’ staff headed by Dmitry Kozak. Under
the Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zhukov the ministries will be totally different from those under his
predecessor Mikhail Kasyanov. They will be responsible for issuing resolutions and orders on jurisdictional
questions. However, they no longer have the right to make specific decisions, e.g., on issuing a license for a
particular type of activity.
We will not question Vladimir Putin’s desire to make executive power in Russia
more effective. Nevertheless, the fact that the government was reorganized a week
before the presidential elections and the very strange circumstances of Mikhail
Kasyanov’s dismissal suggest that what happened was less an action of the
president than part of a presidential candidate’s election campaign. The campaign
itself, whose results at the time this issue of Dengi appeared in print will be better
known to readers than to the author, was unusual. For the first time in Russia’s
history, the country’s population was not voting for the head of state, who will
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probably be Vladimir Putin by a wide margin, but for the people he believes will
bring him absolute victory […]. It looks as if the structural reform of the
government that president and presidential candidate Vladimir Putin put into effect
several days before the elections was not just a preelection ploy. To all
appearances, a real administrative revolution took place in the country. At the
same time, the government’s effectiveness in its new form will show whether
Russia needs a presidential regime with unlimited powers. However, having
become a real rival for presidential power, the new government has signed its own
death warrant
 38.
Although so far it is not clear what was the impact of this reform on the ratification process, it could be
argued that it determined a more coherent approach to the issue.
3.1.3. Administrative divisions
The new Russian Constitution (which came into force on 12
th December 1993) established considerable
powers for the federal executive and left the division of powers between centre and periphery purposefully
ambiguous. Soon after the referendum that narrowly ratified his Constitution, Russia’s first president Boris
Yeltsin launched a trend that patently contradicted the official paper just signed.
Signing treaties (dogovory) and agreeements (soglasheniya) with the executive
heads of ethnic republics (and soon after with oblasts and krais), Yeltsin eroded
the legal equality his Constitution proclaimed for different levels of centre-
periphery relations. Savvy regional negotiators won budget privileges, powers of
appointment, exemption from various federal requirements, and a tacit
understanding that federal officials – at least for the time being – would look away
from glaring violations of the federal Constitution and basic democratic
principles
39.
Yeltsin’s treaties were never ratified by legislatures; their ambiguous enforceability was made clear by the
new president Putin, who showed clear disregard for executive promises that no longer suited his interests.
One of Putin’s first presidential decrees, signed days after his inauguration, divided Russia into seven
federal districts, each encompassing 49 oblast, 21 republics, 10 okrug, (each headed by a presidential
enforcer tasked to maintain the supremacy of federal law), 6 krai, 2 federal cities and 1 autonomous oblast.
Putin described his project as the “dictatorship of law”
40.
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The management of natural resources and the environment falls under Article 72 of the Russian
Constitution, and hence under the joint jurisdiction of federal and regional authorities. According to Article
76 of the Constitution, federal law has priority over regional law in areas of joint jurisdiction, but the
regional authorities nevertheless enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre. “First, federal legislation is still
poorly developed , and it become difficult for federal authorities to change a practice that for years has been
followed in accordance with regional legislation. Second, there is an almost unlimited number of
approaches to an area of law, and Article 76 refers only to instances of direct contradiction between
legislation of the two levels”
41. In addition to this is the fact that individual bilateral agreements have again
come to fill the legal vacuum between the federal centre and more than half of the subjects of the Russian
Federation.
Given this context, it is not surprising that regional support and cooperation are crucial to the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, not only do regions account for a significant share of
greenhouse gas emissions and are thus candidates for potential projects, but they also have an important
role in GHG inventories and data collection. Regional emission data was reported to be compatible with
state level data and Russian experts emphasized that the Kyoto mechanisms could provide a useful tool for
companies in the regions to attract modern environmental technology
42. As seen above, in June 2003, the
working group of the Presidium of State Council of the Russian Federation, which gathers the governors of
the country’s 89 regions, backed Russia’s ratification of the treaty by that September. Despite this positive
result, levels of support vary across Russia.
A recent WWF survey shows a strong support for ratification in Volga, Ural and the Northwest, moderate
support in Siberia and Central provinces and minor support or low awareness in the South and Far East
43.
According to International Herald Tribune, three-quarters of regional governors are in favour of Kyoto and
are competing to bring European investors to their regions
44. Some Russian regions have been actively
preparing their participation in the Kyoto activities. For instance in the Archangelsk region in North-West
Russia the regional administration has been cooperating with energy saving and environmental investment
agencies in order to improve the attractiveness of implementing Kyoto mechanisms in the region.
Arkhangelsk region is currently importing coal and oil products for its energy-intensive wood processing
and pulp and paper industries from other regions. Therefore, the Kyoto-related focus areas of Arkhangelsk
have much potential for energy saving and renewable energy
45. The cooperation between regional
administration and environmental agencies has initiated a regional GHG inventory and spread information
about the Kyoto process to the local industrial actors.
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A potential source of controversy is that of  property rights, which the federal government regards as its
prerogative, while the regions believe that they should belong to them. This line of conflict runs between
the federal and the regional levels in general, especially after the introduction of various measures that may
curb governors and the regional Duma’s authority.
While lying outside this work’s aims, it could be argued that these sets of questions, and other potential
conflicts, reflect the general picture of the Russian political institutions. Arisen as a result of the political
struggle, the Russian presidential system has been defined “ a response to the legacy of the Communist
Party […]; the presidency was a completely new institution in Russia’s political tradition, but still […] it
led back to the autocratic tradition”
46. The nature of political power in Russia, “which is democratic in its
form and authoritarian in its essence, is never strong”
47: Parliament legislates, but the president can rule by
decree in areas where the law is silent. The president can veto acts of parliament; the parliament can stymie
presidential decrees by passing laws which oppose it, and if the president vetoes such a law, a two-thirds
majority of both legislative chambers can override this veto. Although the 178-member Federation Council
expressly represents regional interests, the president can unilaterally overturn regional acts and laws in his
role as “protector of the constitution”
48.
Several of these lines of conflict come into play in the Kyoto Protocol implementation process. Moreover,
according to two scholars who studied national-level political processes following international
environmental agreements, there is one more actor to be taken into consideration: industry enterprises. “As
the Soviet system for implementation of the country’s international environmental obligations (led by the
interdepartmental commission) disintegrated, as the federal environmental agency gradually lost its
authority [see par. 2], and as the public authorities increasingly lost control of industry enterprises, the
enterprises themselves became more important actors in the Russian implementation game”
49.
3.2. Energy Producers
In 2003, Russia’s real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 7.3%, surpassing average growth rates in all
other G8 countries, and marking the country’s fifth consecutive year of economic expansion. Russia’s
economic growth over the last five years has been sustained primarily by energy exports, particularly given
the boom in Russian oil production and relatively high world oil prices during this period. But this type of
growth has made the Russian economy dangerously dependent on oil and natural gas exports, and
especially vulnerable to fluctuations in world oil prices.
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The Russian government has made multiplying economic growth from commodity exports a priority, and is
attempting to restructure and liberalize its energy sector. These reforms have come at the behest of both
Russian oil and natural gas producers, who are seeking to grow in a more liberalized marketplace. Russia's
external trading partners are also pressuring the country to synchronize their policies with those in Western
Europe and North America, particularly vis-a-vis Russia's aspiration towards the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Breaking up the monopolies that control the natural gas and electricity industries would be the key
factor.
In the meantime, however, the Kremlin has shown a tendency to advance the state’s influence in the energy
sector, not to reduce it. In spite of its break-up during the 1990s, in fact, the energy industry as a whole
remains State dominated.
Over the past six months, the Russian Energy Ministry (now known as the
Ministry of Industry and Energy) has been streamlined and empowered; taxes on
oil exports have been raised significantly (effective August 1, 2004); state-owned
export facilities have grown at breakneck pace while private projects have
progressed more slowly or faltered (see Oil Exports); and leading industry figures
have come under criminal investigation at the behest of Russia's Procuracy
General (see Oil Industry Structure). While acknowledging Russia's changing
regulatory environment, as well as the oil and gas sectors' important role in
economic development, President Vladimir Putin said on December 23, 2003,
"The fuel and energy sector, overall, is the goose that lays the golden egg. Killing
the goose would be insane, stupid and unacceptable." Having secured
overwhelming victories in both Parliamentary elections (December 2003) and
Presidential elections (March 2004), President Putin is expected to re-organize his
country's domestic energy industry in his second term, while simultaneously
working towards his pledge to double the country's GDP within 10 years
50.
Beginning in 1993, the oil sector was gradually carved up and partially privatized, starting with the creation
of a Russian State oil company, Rosneft. A series of vertically integrated oil companies were then
established combining oil exploration, production, refining, distribution and retailing. The first of these
were LUKoil, Yukos, and Surgutneftegaz. The decade was marked by the rise of new Russian oil barons or
“oligarchs,” such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Yukos. They used capital from private banks, close political
connections to the Russian government, and financial support to former President Boris Yeltsin in his
presidential campaign to secure title to the crown jewels of Russian energy assets. Instead of investing in
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their new holdings in Russia, energy oligarchs focused on developing new ways of evading taxes, stripping
cash from assets, moving cash offshore, and eviscerating minority shareholders rights
51.
Nowadays, the government maintains majority control over Rosneft (100%) and Slavneft (50%, with a
Russia’s close ally owning the other 50%). It has a significant stake in the Eastern Oil Co. (37%) as well as
in LUKoil (14%). However, individual companies have very different relations with the State that do not
always reflect the State’s share in the enterprise
52. In April 2003, Yukos and Sibneft (the fourth biggest
Russian oil company) announced merger plans to create what would have been Russia's largest oil
company, YukosSibneft. However, investigations into Yukos by Russia's Procuracy General resulted in the
arrests of key figures in Yukos ownership, including Platon Lebedev (July 2003) and company head
Mikhail Khodorkovsky (October 2003), and the seizure of roughly one-half of the company's shares. In
November 2003, representatives from Sibneft suspended the merger and the protocol for de-merging was
signed in February 2004. In June 2004, Khodorkovsky appeared in court in Moscow, charged of tax
evasion, fraud and embezzelment. During the trial, Yukos saw its shares plunge 12 percent on the Moscow
stock exchange.
Khodorkovsky’s trial occurs at a time when the Russian authorities, under President Putin’s seemingly
benign concept of “guided democracy”
53, are exhibiting extraordinary determination to re-establish control
over numerous spheres of public life, business being just one of them. Before his arrest last year,
Khodorkovsky funded opposition political parties and expressed a desire to run for office in the future.
CNN quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin defining the case as part of his "crackdown on corruption"
54
and denies any political motives. Khodorkovsky's supporters say the trial is part of a Kremlin effort to halt
the former oilman's political aspirations and to send a message to other "oligarchs" to tow the line.
The Russian gas industry is dominated by Gazprom, the state-run natural gas monopoly. Single-handedly,
Gazprom holds 25% of world gas reserves and controls 90% of Russian gas output. It is Russia’s largest
earner of hard currency (with 60% of these earnings generated through sales to Europe). Its payments
account for around 20% of federal budget tax revenues
55. However, unlike the Russian oil industry,
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Russia’s natural gas industry has not been booming. Both production and consumption have remained
relatively flat since independence. Growth of Russia’s natural gas sector has been stunted primarily due to
ageing fields, state regulation, insufficient export pipelines, and Gazprom’s monopolistic control over the
industry.
Because exported Russian natural gas accounts for approximately 25% of Europe's demand for natural gas,
as Gazprom's trade relationship with European consumers grows, contentious issues have arisen. European
trade representatives have denounced Gazprom's monopolistic market position and two-tiered pricing
system and have linked the pricing issue to Russia's ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The Russian government has recognized this problem and has been gradually increasing the price for
natural gas domestically.
Although the Russian State’s stake in Gazprom is technically only 38%, the government is the largest
shareholder in the company and Gazprom is also one of Moscow's main foreign policy tools. The close
linkages between the Russian government and the company are considered clear by Russian political
commentators
56.
As with similar patterns in oil and natural gas, Russia’s power sector was stunted by the economic
slowdown which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, electricity generation has shown
both a dramatic decline (down 18% between 1992 and 1999), and a gradual recovery (up 8% between 1999
and 2002). A 1992 Presidential decree restructured the sector into a single joint-stock company, RAO UES
(Unified Energy Sector), and established the company Rosenergoatom to operate all nuclear power stations.
The company, headed by former privatisation minister Anatoly Chubais, controls approximately 70% of the
country's distribution system and oversees Russia's 72 regional electricity companies, called Energos. Most
electricity-industry activities continue to be vertically integrated within UES.
Russia's electricity sector, however, is currently in a transitional period. The federal government is the
company’s principal shareholder: at the end of 2002 it held 52.6%
57. It has made hydroelectric generation a
priority, particularly in the country's Far East, where electricity supply can be problematic. In March 2003,
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed six bills into law which aim to substantially reform the industry.
According to the reform package, UES should be liquidated beginning in 2006. UES's generation and
distribution facilities are expected to be privatised, while the country's transmission grid will remain under
state control.
Some observers claim that one of the most relevant effects of the massive re-organisation of UES is that on
the Kyoto Protocol ratification process. Thermal power (oil, gas, coal) accounts for roughly 63% of Russia's
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electricity generation, followed by hydropower (21%) and nuclear (16%)
58. It is not surprising, then, that
UES alone produces 2% of the world’s greenhouse gases. According to Igor Leshukov, director of the
Institute for International Affairs in St. Petersburg, “when it’s clear who is will get what out of electricity
privatisation, then we’ll see ratification of Kyoto [by Russia]”
59. Carbon Energy Fund, a non-profit
organisation established by UES to handle the Kyoto implementation, stated that, should the treaty be
ratified, UES alone could expect to pocket between 500 million and 800 million euros in modernisation
deals over the next eight years.
Russian companies have also submitted several JI projects under the Netherland’s ERUPT 3 programme
60.
In 2003, the Dutch government proposed UES to fund the modernisation of a power plant in Amursk,
Khabarovsk region, as an investment in a joint implementation project. The Russian authorities, however,
did not give their approval, leaving UES out of a 10 million euros deal and with an antiquated power plant.
The lack of the necessary Letter of Approval from the Russian government may be indicative of Russian
caution over signing anything that could be regarded as a political commitment to deliver ratification, but it
may also reflect government resistance to business JI initiatives at this stage.
UES is not the only Russian business that supports the Kyoto ratification. Companies such as Gazprom and
LUKoil, which, as told below, have partnerships with European energy firms, are also  keen to maintain a
“green” image. Overall, business is trying to move the debate away from politics toward practical
implementation
61. In 2003, for instance, Gazprom already had a JI pilot project with the German Ruhrgas,
aimed at converting an old coal power station to gas. It was turned down as it was not accompanied by the
Letter of Approval from the government
62.
Taking into consideration the energy sector opens a new perspective on the Kyoto Protocol process of
ratification. The past government’s stalling seems to be consistent with the analysed Kremlin pattern in
reforming the energy industry and clenching governmental control over numerous spheres of public life.
The treaty’s potential benefits to the Russian energy sector could be so large that the Kyoto Protocol is
likely to be seen by the federal government as a tool which may further empower business. Putin seems to
be aware of the political influence of big business and then actively seeking to keep it under the
government’s control.
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3.3. Environmental NGOs
As the largest country on Earth, Russia accounts for more than 10% of the world’s total land area, and is
richly endowed with energy, mineral, water and forest resources. However Russia is still paying the legacy
of cross-border contamination from the Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine. They also have plans to earn
hard currency by importing nuclear waste from other countries (which will sum to the wastes from the
military complex and the country’s own 30 operating commercial reactors) and continue to possess an
abundance of pollution from what are now outdated industrial enterprises that lack the funds to clean up.
Finally, as it has been said above, on the climate change front Russia is the second or third largest emitter of
greenhouse gases, although it also is a large potential long-term “carbon sink” because of its vast forest
reserves.
Since the early 1990s, western institutions have provided more than 1 billion dollars of environmental
assistance to Russia for equipment, training, development of non-governmental organizations and technical
analyses. A 1999 survey conducted by Civil Society International and the Johns Hopkins Institute listed 157
environmental organizations operating in the Russian Federation
63 on different fronts, domestic and
international. Several NGOs focus on internal environmental concerns: nuclear contamination, soil erosion,
rapid land conversion, air and water pollution
64.
As for the international commitment, WWF Russia is one of the Russian largest independent conservation
organization involved in global projects, and one of the most active supporters of the Kyoto Protocol.
Through its press office
65 and the statements and reports of its authoritative coordinator of the Russian
Climate Program, Alexey Kokorin, reported by national and international media, WWF plays a crucial role
in coordinating the environmental pro-Kyoto pressure.
In a brochure that first appeared in April 2003, the WWF analysed the framework of the preparation
process of ratification and discussed information and facts commonly associated with the Protocol. A few
months later, the first brochure was followed by a second edition, which reiterated the arguments put
forward in the previous edition and contained answers to many more recent questions
66. This document
represents one of the most well documented and methodical works presented by an NGO on the Kyoto
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Protocol. It can thus be an interesting reference in order to define the environmentalist position on the
matter. A quotation from the brochure summarizes the WWF position on the ratification process:
Russia may benefit from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, but Russia needs
to ratify the Protocol in the first place. If Russia fails to do so, it will lose any
subsequent benefits and its positive reputation in the international political arena.
Russia will also suffer a negative reaction from potential investors, while its
economic competitors will get a competitive advantage. Russia will lose a lot of
available foreign investment opportunities.
At the same time, the benefits of the Kyoto Protocol will not accrue automatically.
Active measures will be needed, such as development and implementation of a
strong national policy and implementation program, as well as optimal utilization
of flexibility mechanism provided by the Protocol. Russia will need to conduct an
active international and domestic policy of industrial restructuring
67.
A desire for a better environment is widely supported in abstract. In a survey in Russia between 1993 and
2001, respondents were asked questions that were likely to be of real significance to individuals and were
intended to estimate their willingness to trade-off the environment against specific material outcomes
68. The
first question asked people to decide whether they valued job security even if it meant continuing pollution
– a potentially important issue at a time when unemployment was increasing. The second question asked
respondents whether they would be willing to support environmental policies even if this led to falling
living standards, again a relevant concern when living standards were falling.
The results show considerable differences of opinion across respondents. What is notable in general,
however, is the extent of support for environmental protection even given the relevant costs that
respondents were asked to take into account. Taking all the surveys together, no more than 47% of the
respondents answered that it was important to preserve people’s job even if it meant keeping polluting
enterprises open. And fully 65% disagreed with the proposition that people should have higher incomes
even if this resulted in damage to the environment.
The survey’s results account for a country that believes that pollution exists and could be a problem.
However, although the environment has long been an area of permissible dissent, according to a WWF
Russia analysis the wider public is generally more concerned with domestic problems than international
affairs
69. Environmental policymaking appears fragmented and, as it has been shown in the previous pages,
many of the institutions responsible for it are unstable. Russian NGOs may have a particularly prominent
role in the reconnection of the public interest in sustainable development to government priorities for
environmental protection.
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However, Russian NGOs who work on environmental issues have traditionally been distant from the public
and the communities in which they work. The leaders and members of these NGOs are often scientists,
technical experts, and other professionals who tend to value their links to the scientific community, but who
may not be inclined to consult "ordinary citizens." Indeed, a 2002 survey of Russian environmental NGOs
found that 70 percent of these groups routinely consult with scientists to advance their work, while only 30
percent routinely seek involvement from the public
70.
The survey also found that most environmental NGOs do not work with other Russian or international
NGOs on a regular basis. They consult even less frequently with anyone in local government. Weakest of
all is their relationship with the private sector. Ninety-two percent of NGOs surveyed reported working
with business or industry only "occasionally" or "never". The absence of close working relations with these
groups means that Russian environmental NGOs often lack an effective entry point to decision-making
71.
The problem of civic disengagement goes beyond the NGO community. Many Russian citizens do not
actively seek to participate in environmental NGOs or in the political process. This is not due to any legal
constraint on public participation. Russians have a constitutional and statutory right to participate in public
decision-making and to give their input on environmental matters. Yet, a recent poll indicates that only 5
percent of Russians currently participate in public organizations and nearly 75 percent say they have no
interest in doing so
72.
These results point to the difficulty of building coalitions for action around environmental problems in
Russia today. The only exception is related with the public concern about the role of the environment in
health issues. Nearly 60 percent of 3,300 Russians surveyed in 2000 reported that they believed the
environment caused or contributed to chronic illnesses in their family
73. If it can be tapped, this concern
may offer a viable path to public engagement.
Russian NGOs are clearly starting to understand the need to involve the public in their work. More than 40
percent of environmental NGOs now rank "increased public involvement" as a top priority for improving
environmental policies
74. This means facing the challenge of attracting public attention, exploiting the most
efficient means for this goal. Green organizations are thus forced to fight on one of the bloodiest battlefields
of our times: the media.
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3.4. News Media
Providing a common arena for the different protagonists to face and challenge each other, the media
contribute to and complete the framework of the internal forces interacting in the Kyoto Protocol process.
Understanding the press coverage of the ratification issues, however, requires a wider glance at the Russian
media sector. Its position between state and market makes it an extremely peculiar system.
3.4.1. Russian media between state and market
For much of the 1990s, the development of independent media was considered a clear success of the
Russian political transformation. The 1990 Law on the Press laid the legal foundation for the creation of
print outlets independent from the state. The end of the state monopoly on media ownership gave
journalists unprecedented freedom to criticise the authorities. A survey conducted in 1990 by the
Commission for Freedom of Access to Information, a Russian NGO, showed that 70% of respondents
relied on media reports
75. New print and electronic media sprang up. While often led by brilliant and
charismatic personalities, these “editorial collectives of journalists” lacked capable business managers.
As economic conditions worsened, journalists realized that the easiest way out of a difficult financial
situation was either to seek government subsidies or look for investors among emerging businesses. The
latter solution was preferred, and became increasingly popular in Moscow. The first business tycoons were
indeed figuring out the political importance of the media for their interests.
The main tool of influence in a country as vast as Russia is of course television. At the end of 1993, the two
channels with nation-wide reach, Channel One (Ostankino) and Channel Two (Russian Television) were
both owned and managed by the state. In 1995, the Kremlin resolved to allow the privatisation of Channel
One. The state maintained control over the newly created Public Russian Television (ORT) through various
Russian agencies that held 51% of its shares; a consortium of banks and emerging industrial groups held the
remaining 49%. Boris Berezovsky was the man behind the consortium and the ORT’s largest single
shareholder. He was a Kremlin insider and head of LogoVAZ, an industrial conglomerate based on a car
dealership. Berezovsky, and his fellow media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky, were the first to understand the
importance of media ownership to protect their other financial interests.
A turning-point for the Moscow-based media was marked by the 1996 presidential election. Yeltsin’s
candidacy appeared hopeless just six months before the election. The threat represented by the election
victory of a Communist candidate, Gennadi Zyuganov, made it possible for privately owned media to join
state-controlled outlets in supporting the re-election efforts of President Yeltsin. As Laura Belin argues,
                                                          
75 Quoted in FOSSATO F., “The Russian Media: From Popularity to Distrust”, in Current History, 100 (2001) 64825
“even though no experimental data have proved that media coverage was the decisive factor in the 1996
election, it is an axiom in Russia that Yeltsin would not have won without the media’s support
76.
Yeltsin’s re-election encouraged other financial and industrial groups to expand their media holdings. By
the end of Yeltsin’s second presidential term (1999), Berezovsky’s media empire included control over
television channels ORT and TV-6, 3 newspapers, including the relevant Kommersant, a number of weekly
political, business and entertainment magazines. Announcing the creation of Gazprom Media in 1997, the
gas monopoly Gazprom, which had provided informal financial support to some newspapers in the early
1990s, began to acquire shares in various print and electronic media. Gazprom also had a 30% stake in
Russia’s main private television channel, NTV
77.
Gusinsky’s television channel NTV emerged in 1993 and led to the creation of his MediaMOST holding.
NTV was the only private television network to obtain a virtually nation-wide broadcast reach and
widespread popularity. The rapid rise of Gusinsky’s media empire and its equally rapid decline in 2000 and
2001 provide a vivid description of the close relationship between media and political power. Interactions
between the two are crucial in understanding the role of the media in the Kyoto’s ratification process.
Strengthening political connections with the Kremlin and Moscow authorities at first guaranteed NTV a
number of tax breaks and customs duty exemptions on imported equipment. The 1996 presidential race
provided more benefits: Yeltsin’s re-election brought his backers a payoff. While Berezovsky was
appointed secretary of the presidential Security Council, NTV was granted the right to broadcast nation-
wide and 24 hours a day. According to Fossato, “this moment marked the NTV’s triumph. Gusinsky
consolidated his information business through his MediaMOST holding, including new publications and
radio and television ventures in the regions, as well as a satellite project that, in Gusinsky’s view, would
ensure his independence from the state. Meanwhile, Gusinsky’s top managers continued their cooperation
with the Kremlin, making it possible to obtain guarantees from Gazprom and other state agencies for
multimillion-dollar credits
78”.
In 1997 and 1998, Russian society witnessed several rounds of so-called information wars, when some of
the leading oligarchs fought among themselves for the right to impose their personal views on future
business and political developments. The Kremlin’s 2000 presidential campaign was aimed at ensuring the
election of a successor of its choice. NTV and other MediaMOST outlets were desirable allies, but
agreement on a single candidate to support clearly was impossible this time. Gusinsky refused to back
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and supported instead Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov (who was involved in
media market, as TV-Tsentr owner). NTV reports on the military campaign in Chechnya often featured
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77 See http://www.rferl.org/specials/russia/media6/part4.asp; at this address, the website of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty offers a series of reports on “Russian Media Empires” by F. Fossato e A. Kachkaeva
78 FOSSATO F., “The Russian Media: From Popularity to Distrust”, p. 34726
both sides of the conflict. Other Russian main media supported Putin and his strong message against
Chechnya guerrilla. As Belin puts it,
The use of the media as weapons to decimate Fatherland-All Russia [alliance led
by former Prime Minister Primakov and Luzhkov] and promote Putin’s first-round
election victory were part of a larger development in the late 1990s: an attempt to
reassert the state’s role in managing media coverage
79.
The newly created Federal Commission on Competitions for Television and Radio Broadcasting, controlled
by the Media ministry, had power to concede and retire licensing for media. Though not at risk of losing its
licence, NTV and its parent company, MediaMOST, came under increasing economic and political pressure
beginning in June 1999, when a state-controlled bank demanded the holding repay a huge loan in cash.
Although that loan was repaid following a court battle, more pressure followed from Gazprom’s chief
executive, who criticised NTV’s coverage of the war in Chechnya. The following month, Gazprom
demanded reimbursement for a 211 million dollar loan it had repaid to a bank on MediaMOST’s behalf. In
part Media-MOST managers were to blame for their predicament, because they failed to create a media
organization truly independent from the state. But ORT was not asked to repay its 100 million dollar loan
from the same bank.
After criminal investigations, intimidating police raids and the systematic dismantling of MediaMOST, in
the early 2001 Gusinsky was eventually obliged to cede control of his media empire to Gazprom. Acting
through industrial groups such as Gazprom and Lukoil the Kremlin also ordered the closure of
Berezovsky’s TV-6 in January 2002. TV-6 was replaced by TVS, which soldiered on as Russia's only
privately-owned national network until the authorities pulled the plug in June 2003, officially for financial
reasons. According to the American based Freedom House, an international organization dedicated to
media rights and democracy, TVS was “the country’s last independent television station, [for which]
authorities rejected a new investor ready to assume the network’s debt”
80.
Print media are rarely independent financially. The entire advertising market in the Russian Federation is
less than the amount spent annually for advertising by Procter and Gamble
81. Most publications are
subsidised, either by government or by private individuals.
Many observers state that the Internet is probably the least restricted communication means among the
“managed pluralism” of media in Russia
82. According to 2002 data, fewer than 10% of Russians use the
Internet, and about 4% use it regularly (the world’s average percentage of users does not reach 10%)
83.
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83 MARCUS A., “The Internet in Putin’s Russia. Reinventing a Technology of Authoritarianism”, Oxford University,
2003, in http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2003/marcus%20alexander.pdf. The paper is a well documented analysis on the
Internet policy in Russia. The game theoretic model introduced to explain the Russian case shows that the promotion27
Table 1 shows the main Russian non-electronic media at June 2004.
Table 1: Russian traditional media
The press
•  Komsomolskaya Pravda: mass circulation, outspoken daily, controlled by tycoon Vladimir Potanin
•  Kommersant: liberal, business-orientated, controlled by tycoon Boris Berezovsky
•  Moskovskiy Komsomolets: popular daily controlled by Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov
•  Izvestia: popular daily controlled by tycoon Vladimir Potanin
•  Rossiyskaya Gazeta: official government newspaper
•  Nezavisimaya Gazeta:  influential privately-owned daily
•  Argumentiy i Faktiy:  popular weekly
•  Sovetskaya Rossiya: pro-Communist daily
•  Krasnaya Zvezda:  Defence Ministry newspaper
•  The Moscow Times: English-language daily
Television
•  Russia TV Channel:  national network, run by state-owned Russian State Television and Radio
Broadcasting Company (RTR)
•  Channel One:  national network, 51% owned by state, 49% by private shareholders
•  NTV:  national network, owned by gas monopoly Gazprom
•  Centre TV:  commercial, Moscow area
•  Ren TV: commercial
Radio
•  Radio Russia:  national network run by state-owned Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting
Company (RTR)
•  Moscow Echo:  influential private station
•  Radio Mayak:  state-run national network
•  Voice of Russia:  external service, broadcasts in English and other languages
News agencies
•  Itar-Tass:  state-owned
•  RIA-Novosti: state-owned, pages in English
•  Interfax:  private, pages in English
Source: BBC news (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102275.stm#media)
                                                                                                                                                                                             
of Internet access and Information and Communication Technologies proliferation can be turned into direct and
indirect propaganda.28
3.4.2. Media coverage of the Kyoto Protocol Process
Statistical data and reports regarding the Russian media releases on the Kyoto treaty are not available in
English. What can be found on the Internet are press reviews on environmental issues provided by political
institutions
84 or environmental NGOs
85. However, a simple searching on three popular newspapers, in their
English version on the Internet, shows that the process which brought the Kyoto Protocol to Parliament for
approval received a fair amount of attention.
The three newspapers were Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Pravda and The Moscow Times. The former two have an
English version available on the web
86, the latter is an English-language daily
87. According to a 2002
survey, Gazeta.ru was the most visited Russian online media, while Pravda.ru occupied the eighth place.
Searching the archives of the English version for the occurrences of the string “Kyoto protocol” in the April
2002- June 2004 period (thus excluding the weeks immediately preceding the final decision by the Russian
Cabinet), results are as follows:




Not surprisingly, the most Western and business-oriented title predominates in references to an
international treaty. Comparison with other strings makes it possible to appraise the data
88. Although the
newspapers seem to pay a little attention to the protocol, it is worth stressing that Gazeta quoted the Kyoto
Protocol on average 2.2 times a month, Pravda 1.2, The Moscow Times 3.1. The World Trade Organization,
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www.ln.mid.ru
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www.bellona.no
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87 www.themoscowtimes.com
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“Terrorism” “WTO” “Environment” “Kaliningrad pass
plan EU”*
“PCA”**
Gazeta.ru 793 113 109 10 10
Pravda.ru 269 81 275 18 0
Themoscowtimes.
com
1.111 293 739 38 7
* Special transit arrangements for residents of Russia’s isolated enclave of Kaliningrad after Poland and Lithuania join
the EU. The issue has been raised for the first time in April 2002 and the first EU-Russia Joint Statement was adopted
in November 2002.
** Partnership Cooperation Accord (see throughout the chapter).29
for which Russia first applied in 1993, was mentioned respectively 4.3, 3.1 and 11.2 times a month: the gap
floats from less than 2 to little more than 3 times. But WTO has recently been increasingly in the spotlight;
during last May a EU-Russia agreement was signed concluding the access negotiations that brought Russia
Federation a long step closer to accession to the WTO.
Although quantitative data are merely partial, a content and sources’ analysis overcomes this work’s
boundaries. According to many observers, however, keeping high pressure on the ratification issues in the
local media is instrumental. “While apparently signalling intense internal debate, by raising the possibility
of non-ratification it may well be a ploy to up the stakes on ratification
89”. The media worked as amplifiers
of the political pressures, business’ expectations, and NGOs’ campaigns that surrounded the Kyoto
Protocol.
This is not a case limited to Russia. Over recent decades the environment has become a key area of
international debate. At various points in time different environmental issues have come to the fore of
public and political attention. It can be argued that to some extent this reflects the activities of issue sponsor
such as politicians, scientists and environmental pressure groups, as well as news media agendas. Problems
concerning the environment involve making complex choices about a number of interconnecting issues that
are often characterised by a great deal of scientific uncertainty
90.
The Climate Change Conference held in Moscow in September 2003 is a case in point. According to a
report by the Centre for European Policy Studies, “the organisers […] attempted to draw a lot of media
attention with political statements based on arguments that were not very strong. Since climate change is
not covered by the media in Russia in the same way as it is in the EU, however, their statements did have a
strong impact”
91.
Given their tightly controlled nature, due to their property set-ups, the Russian media intervened in the
political debate regarding the Kyoto Protocol in a peculiar way. Rather than a protagonist in it, they
appeared to be a tool of the current negotiation policy.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In October 2004, Russia endorsed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which was signed by the country
in 1997. This paper has analysed the influence groups that operate in the Russian political scene. We
showed that no one of these, singularly taken, appears to be able to influence the ratification process’
                                                          
89 KARAS J., Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: Political Challenges, p. 6
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outcome. Altogether, however, they provide the elements that place the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol
within an extremely complex picture, in which political and social factors play a remarkable role.
Russia’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol sent a strong signal for international climate policy, but was
also widely criticised by domestic voices. Indeed, scientists from the Russian Academy of Sciences had
concluded that the Kyoto Protocol did not have the scientific substantiation. Russian academicians had
analysed the possible consequences of the Kyoto Protocol’s implementation on the Russian economy and
advised that global warming would have several rather positive effects for Russia as the “coldest country in
the world.” According to the president's economic advisor, Andrey Illarionov, considered as the main critic
of the Kyoto Protocol in Russia, the treaty is nothing than a “big lie” given the lack of authoritative
scientific proof and the expected negative effect on Russia’s economic growth induced by a reduced energy
consumption
92.
Given the complexities that we have highlighted related to the Russian internal forces, let us now try to
identify the other main factors that have been decisive in inducing the country to bring the long-lasting
ratification process to an end. President Putin has thus taken his decision based on motivations other than
domestic ones. For this reason, we need to go beyond the rather “internal” vision on which we have focused
until now, trying to highlight the incentives of the different groups, the driving forces prevailing in the
country and the perspectives that would be realistic if the things were visualised only from inside of Russia.
Given this approach, the analysis has been abstracting from the various external forces that influence the
process. These latter factors, and in particular political incentives related to Russia’s economic perspectives,
appear to have been decisive in inducing the country to bring the long-lasting ratification process to an end.
As has clearly emerged from the policy process, Russia has achieved a particularly relevant bargaining
power in the Kyoto process after the US withdrawal and is using this increased negotiation position to
obtain as many additional benefits as possible. Already at the COP 7 in Marrakech, Russia has been able to
almost double its sink concessions and since this time various financial incentives have been set to induce
Russia to co-operate. The last, most significant example of this strategy is represented by the deal
confirming the connection between Russia's WTO entry and the Russian ratification: the European Union
agreed to back Russia's bid to join the WTO by softening conditions on energy pricing, while President
Putin said that he will speed up the process towards ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, though without any
formal agreement.
93
                                                          




93 In addition, the EU has for example planned to issue 2 million euros to Russia for the institutional support of the
treaty if Russia ratifies the Kyoto Protocol. This support is supposed to take place under the TACIS (Technical
Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States) project (CO2e.com, Sept.9th 2002).31
The most important motivation for Russia’s final decision seems thus to be the fact that the Russian
administration strongly strives for Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization. In order to obtain
support for Russia's WTO membership, Russia apparently was ready to bear several sacrifices. First,
China’s support was achieved by transferring them two islands in Russia's Far East. Then, Russia needed to
take the hurdle of convincing the European Union. In order to provide support to Russia’s WTO bid, in
May 2004 the EU asked for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Although this statement induced several
Russian politicians to start bargaining with the EU on different topics
94, the Russian government chose to
satisfy the EU request. Putin’s decision clearly indicated that Russia’s ratification is related to the provision
of sufficient economic incentives and was thus particularly motivated by the potential positive financial
consequences of the Kyoto Protocol’s ratification
95. This tendency was also visible through immediate
reactions on the European carbon market, where Putin’s statement has triggered some large-scale trading in
emission credits by companies and countries
96. The emphasis on financial incentives has also been
reiterated after the Kremlin’s announcement of Russia’s ratification in late September, when experts
suggested that Russia could earn up to 10 billion USD by developing a sales strategy and restricting supply
of quotas to sell into the global emissions trading market
97. The importance of participating in the
international carbon market has also been confirmed by a recent statement by an official form the Russian
Economy Ministry, according to which Russia is considering to set up a domestic emissions trading system
that could be linked to the EU trading scheme, and a potential Canadian system, from the year 2008
98.
In brief, Russia’s decision is being widely seen as Moscow's strategy to benefit from emissions-quota
trading and secure European Union support for its bid to enter the World Trade Organization. Russia’s
strategy can thus been considered as a type of “issue linkage” strategy, in which the country has decided to
implements a type of “environment-for-trade” swap
99. In order to reduce Russia’s incentives to free-ride on
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99 “Issue linkage” has been proposed by both the economic and the political science literature on international
environmental agreements as one of the main economic mechanisms able to increase participation in environmental
cooperation. This policy strategy  is based on the idea that countries may have incentives to free ride on a global
public good (e.g. the environmental issue), but these incentives become much smaller if negotiations on the global
public good are linked with negotiations on another economic issue (typically a club good whose benefits cannot be
reaped by free-riders). See Carraro and Galeotti (2003) for a survey on incentive-based policy strategies and Buchner
et al. (2002) for a discussion of issue linkage in the context of climate change control.32
the climate issue – a typical public good problem –, negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol have indeed been
linked to negotiations on economic issues. The linkage of cooperation on climate change control with
cooperation on the entrance to the WTO has actually induced Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
From a rather Russia-internal vision, this paper’s main findings provide some indications on the reasons of
the recent developments. The governmental pattern in reforming and extending control over numerous
spheres of public life, in fact, grants President Putin a conspicuous power. In addition, President Putin has
recently implemented several actions regarding Russian institutions. Over the past six months, a structural
reform of the governmental departments has been put into effect, a massive re-organisation of the energy
sector has been undertaken and key industrial and media figures have come under criminal investigation.
Many observers see these developments as part of a strategy aimed at strengthening Kremlin power to the
prejudice of other forces. Moreover, the overwhelming victories in both Parliamentary and Presidential
elections secured President Putin a considerable political control. This, in turn, was able to determine the
more resolute approach to the ratification issue that we have been able to observe during the final phase of
the ratification process. At the internal level, indeed, the Kyoto ratification issue was increasingly in Putin’s
hands, as stressed also by his statement in the context of the WTO deal. The domestic influence groups that
operate in the Russian political scene have clearly acted as pressure groups, as particularly the Russian
energy sector, but the President plays the protagonist role.
The possibility of getting support for its WTO membership, obtainable only through cooperation on climate
change control, has thus constituted a sufficient incentive for Russia to comply with the Kyoto targets. The
Russian adoption process of the Kyoto Protocol has thus proved to be meaningful even beyond the aspects
strictly related to the international climate change policy as it offers a peculiar observation on the country
and the difficult period of transformation it is dealing with. However, the analysis of the entire
consequences of the Kyoto Protocol is still insufficient in Russia, as the topic has apparently mainly
received attention for related political and economic issues. In the end, Russia has thus ratified the Kyoto
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